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Abstract: The author examines The Duke of Stockbridge: A Romance of Shays’ 
Rebellion (1879), a historical novel written by Edward Bellamy (1850–1898) 
in order to examine the ethics of Romance in the treatment of historical 
fiction. Edward Bellamy, most famous for his socialist novel, Looking Backwards 
(1888), himself looks backwards to examine the popular rebellion during the 
early post-revolutionary American democracy before the US Constitution was 
established. The striking feature of this novel is the way that it superimposes the 
romance genre onto political and historical events. Using the ethical criticism 
of J. Hillis Miller, Martha Nussbaum, Alasdair MacIntyre, and others, the 
paper examines the romance genre in relation to virtue ethics to analyze the 
ethical impulse in Bellamy’s historical novel. To what degree does romance – a 
literary genre that combines stock characters and stereotypical action – open 
itself up to analysis in terms of the “virtue ethics” of Nussbaum, MacIntyre, and 
others? To what degree does an analysis of Bellamy’s novel in these terms allow 
us to understand what I call the “rhetorical ethics” of a critic like Miller? An 
examination of the Genteel Literary Tradition prevalent at the time of Bellamy’s 
novel – as it manifests itself in language and historical representation – allows 
us to see more closely the relations among rhetoric, character and ethics in the 
historical novel.
Keywords: ethics; historical novel; Edward Bellamy; The Duke of Stockbridge
The romance, which deals with heroes, is inter-
mediate between the novel, which deals with 
men, and the myth, which deals with gods.
    
– Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism
The Argument
The epigraph comes from Northrop Frye’s discipline-defining text, Anatomy 
of Criticism (1957), and it touches upon my first thought for studying historical 
fiction. I had originally planned in this essay to offer an argument that contrasts 
the heroism of Romance to the realism that is necessary to ethical seriousness 
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by examining the way that Edward Bellamy (1850–1898), in his novel The 
Duke of Stockbridge: A Romance of Shays’ Rebellion (1879), takes the morally 
serious situation of injustice and political rebellion and presents it in the form of 
Romance, which presents itself in a very different manner from the seriousness 
of ethical considerations. That lack of seriousness takes the trivial form of 
occasional misspellings of Shays’ name in some reprintings of his novel and 
the much less trivial form of romanticizing politics and transforming historical 
figures facing deep moral choices (which include issues of life and death) into 
a romantic tale of courtship and love. But the more I pursued this topic, the 
more I realized that focusing on the historical and ethical issues concerning 
the Genteel Literary Tradition of the late nineteenth century in which Bellamy 
found himself and larger issue of the ethical implications of generic choices 
should take precedence over the close reading of the novel I had originally 
envisioned. Emerging from this “larger issue” is the question of the ethics of 
literary representation more generally, and what light a discussion of literary 
representation – in this case, a romantic representation of historical facts – might 
shed light on our understanding of ethics more generally.
Shays’ Rebellion
To this end, this essay touches upon the relationships among literature, politics, 
genre, and ethics. As the anchor of this paper, it examines Edward Bellamy’s 
historical novel, The Duke of Stockbridge: A Romance of Shays’ Rebellion, in order 
to examine the ethics of romance in the treatment of historical fiction. Edward 
Bellamy, most famous for his socialist novel on an imagined future, Looking 
Backwards (1888), focuses this novel on the historical past, on post-revolutionary 
America in which the states were governed by the Articles of Confederation. 
Great unrest in these years after the defeat of the British by George Washington 
and the Continental Army brings into pronounced relief the relationship 
between the political and the ethical: it was a time, amply demonstrated in the 
novel, during which powerful men in urban political centers obtained landed 
wealth for themselves by manipulating the courts and the monetary system of 
the new, loosely governed Republic. This unrest and political instability was a 
major impetus for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788. The striking 
feature of this novel is the way that it superimposes the Romance genre onto 
political and historical events. More recently, in 2007, William Martin focuses 
on Shays’ rebellion in a thriller rather than a romance novel entitled The Lost 
Constitution. In many ways, it is more appropriate to take up a rebellion in the 
context of a thriller than a romance insofar as a thriller focuses on a prominent 
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aspect of rebellion, namely its action and violence, while romance, as a genre of 
that pushes towards reconciliation and love, seems altogether alien to rebellion. 
Both thriller and romance, however, eschew the moral gravity of rebellion, which 
historical fiction often captures. 
Shays’ Rebellion was an armed uprising, primarily in western Massachusetts, 
that took place in 1786 and 1787. It was an uprising of American farmers against 
state and local enforcement of tax collections and judgments for debt. In fact, 
farmers rose again local and state governments from New Hampshire to South 
Carolina, but the rebellion was most intense in Massachusetts, where bad 
harvests, economic depression, and high taxes threatened farmers with the 
loss of their farms. A veteran of the American Revolutionary War, Daniel Shays 
– a former captain in the Continental Army – led several thousand  men in 
rising up against widespread economic injustices and suspension of civil rights, 
which included many evictions and foreclosures of Massachusetts homes and 
farmlands by the government in Boston. At one point the rebels attempted 
to capture the United States’ national weapons arsenal at the U.S. Armory 
at Springfield. Shays’ Rebellion was defeated in Massachusetts by a privately 
raised militia, but it prompted numerous national leaders (including George 
Washington, who came out of retirement to deal with issues raised by Shays’ 
Rebellion) to call for a stronger national government to suppress both future 
rebellions and the local state corruption that might, as in Shays’ Rebellion, give 
rise to armed resistance. In fact, the Constitutional Convention began sitting in 
May 1787, so there was some slight overlap between Shays’ Rebellion – which 
wasn’t closely coordinated across the many states in which uprisings occurred – 
and the deliberation over the new American governmental structure.1
The Genteel Tradition
In the early 1960s Norman Mailer presented a talk at the Modern Language 
Association meeting that he later published under the title “Cannibals and 
Christians” that deals with what he calls “the Dynamic of American Letters.” 
He begins by asserting that there “has been a war at the center of American 
letters for a long time” (1966: 96). The war in American letters, he notes, is a 
class war between an upper middle class looking for “a refinement of itself to 
prepare a shift to the aristocratic” and “a counter-literature whose roots were 
found in poverty, industrial society, and the emergence of a new class” (1966: 
1 For a fine historical account of Shays’ Rebellion and responses to it – particularly that 
of Washington – see Larson 2014: 78–84.
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96). Mailer goes on to define this war in literary terms – “Naturalism versus 
the Genteel Tradition it has been called” (1966: 98) – and to figure the warfare 
as that between Edith Wharton and Theodore Dreiser. But after the failure 
of Dreiser, Mailer suggests, the warfare itself degenerates into the opposition 
between cannibals and Christians, the “Camp” discourse of Terry Southern and 
the morality of Saul Bellow: “literature was down to the earnest novel and the 
perfect novel, to moral seriousness and Camp. Herzog and Candy had become 
the protagonists.” (1966: 100)  
What is striking about Mailer’s discussion is the way that it raises up, in 
literary-generic terms, the issue of ethics, moral seriousness, and Camp. “Camp” 
is a term that is no longer as fashionable as it was the 1960s. It designates a 
social, cultural, and aesthetic style and sensibility based on deliberate and 
self-acknowledged theatricality. Camp aesthetics disrupt many notions of 
high and morally serious art by inverting aesthetic attributes such as beauty, 
value, and taste through an invitation of a different kind of apprehension and 
consumption.2 While it would be mistaken to take Romance, as Bellamy uses 
the term, to be “camp,” it is instructive to contrast Romance – and particularly 
the Genteel Tradition in late nineteenth-century America that Bellamy is using 
as a guide for translating historical seriousness into popular middle-class art – 
with high and moral seriousness. The difference between the two traditions – 
both the Genteel Tradition and Naturalism Mailer describes and Romance and 
ethically-inf lected historical fiction I will be describing – has to do with the 
manner in which practical politics might be understood in relation to fiction. 
Mailer bluntly describes such an ethico-political aspect of fiction as “power 
or the secrets of power”: “In opposition to Dreiser,” Mailer writes, “was the 
imperfectly developed counter-tradition of the genteel. The class which wielded 
the power which ran America,” he says, “and the class which most admired that 
class, banded instinctively together to approve a genteel literature which had 
little to do with power or the secrets of power [...] a literature which had to do 
finally with the excellence of belonging to their own genteel tradition” (1966: 
122). More recently than Mailer, Frank Lentriccia describes the “genteel poets 
and critics” of the 1890s in America as powerfully distinct from the poets and 
critics of “the Paterian nineties of British Aestheticism” insofar as they “valued 
purity above all, the rigorous evacuation from poetry of sensuousness and the 
sensual, and of any tendencies of social representation” (1994: xi). The Genteel 
writers, Lentriccia notes,
2 For a thorough account of “camp,” see McMahon 2006. 
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flew from the world that capital was making [...] and [from] the (then) avant-
garde presence of realist and naturalist fiction and all the repulsive social ref-
erences of this new writing: the classes, middle and lower, in uneasy relation 
and movement, America’s new (and swarthy) immigrants, business, money, 
power, sex, divorce, and other distinctly non-ideal preoccupations of a post-
aristocratic literary world. [...] Of course, they were attacked – from Twain 
and Howells to Santayana, Van Wyck Brooks, and Mencken – for being out of 
touch: hopelessly nostalgic, prudish, feminine, all enervated lyric inwardness. 
In Santayana’s unfair phrase for Emerson: they digested vacancy [...] [Still,] 
the genteel poets maybe digested vacancy. In fact, it’s hard to say what they 
digested. They would have agreed, at any rate, that they were out of touch: they 
intended to be out of touch; it was the nature and function of poetry to be out 
of touch. (1994: xi–xii)
To be out of touch designates a refusal of contact with the relentless worldliness 
of ethics, and the genteel poets (and the Genteel Tradition of late nineteenth-
century America more generally) f led such worldliness to such a degree that 
Lentriccia asserts that their “odor was distinctly one of mildewed and dusty 
old books” (1994: xii). That is, where the Genteel Tradition f led, in its escape 
from the bustling worldliness of late nineteenth century America, was to the 
idealization of Romance and cliché. 
The Nature of Romance, the Work of Ethics, and 
The Duke of Stockbridge 
In Anatomy of Criticism, Northrop Frye offers what has become a standard 
definition of Romance. “The essential difference between novel and romance,” 
he writes,
lies in the conception of characterization. The romancer does not attempt to 
create “real people” so much as stylized figures which expand into psychologi-
cal archetypes [...]  That is why the romance so often radiates a glow of subjec-
tive intensity that the novel lacks [...] The novelist deals with personality, with 
characters wearing their personae or social masks. He needs the framework of 
a stable society, and many of our best novelists have been conventional to the 
verge of fussiness. The romancer deals with individuality, with characters in 
vacuo idealized by reverie [...] (1957: 304–05)
This definition of Romance nicely comports with the sense of Genteel Tradition 
suggested by Mailer and delineated by Lentriccia: its sense of “subjective 
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intensity,” reverie, above all examining “characters in vacuo” in a manner that 
suggests Santayana’s notion of feeding off vacancy.
In The Political Unconscious, however, Fredric Jameson takes up Frye’s 
definition of Romance to uncover the political and ethical dimensions of 
storytelling. “Frey’s identification of narrative in general with the particular 
narrative genre of romance,” he writes, “raises the apparently unrelated issue of 
genre criticism, which  ... has in fact always entertained a privileged relationship 
with historical materialism” (1981: 105). Jameson is suggesting that the narrative 
form intersects with historical values so that we can read, as he does with Joseph 
Conrad, the ethical and political implications of choices and omissions in 
narrative form. What narrative chooses in storytelling reverberates in ethics. 
Thus, the fleeing of the Genteel Tradition is an ethical choice not to engage 
history, which is to say not to acknowledge the possibility of a “post-aristocratic 
literary world.” In order to touch upon how Bellamy’s choice to portray Shays’ 
Rebellion in the form of Romance constitutes a similar ethical gesture, I want 
to turn to the “work” of ethics.
To this end let me examine Aristotle’s notion of “practical reason.” I want to 
do so because it is clear that for Aristotle practical reasoning – the Greek term 
is phronesis – is “understanding that manifests itself in action” (Schleifer and 
Vannatta 2013: 58), and an important way to grasp the ethical dimension of 
literary narrative is to think of the writer’s choice, such as the choice of genre, as 
an action with ethical consequences. Towards the end of After Virtue, Alasdair 
MacIntyre describes Aristotle’s conception of practical reason in relation to 
tradition. It is the case, he argues,
that an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp of those future 
possibilities which the past has made available to the present. Living traditions, 
just because they continue a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a future 
whose determinate and determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives 
from the past.
In practical reasoning the possession of this virtue is not manifested so much 
in the knowledge of a set of generalizations or maxims which may provide our 
practice inference with major premises; its presence or absence rather appears in 
the kind of capacity for judgment which the agent possesses in knowing how to 
select among the relevant stack of maxims and how to apply them in particular 
situations. (1984: 223)
MacIntyre’s argument, that the past makes future possibilities available for the 
present is a wonderful way of thinking about historical fiction: like fiction in 
general – and like ethics as I will describe it here – historical fiction occasions 
the thoughtful deliberation of what is to be.  
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Moreover, the not-yet-completed narrative that MacIntyre mentions 
deliberately describes the manner in which The Duke of Stockbridge accomplishes 
two things. First of all, the novel attempts, as all historical novels do, to create 
a living sense of the past. But in Bellamy’s case, The Duke of Stockbridge also 
attempts to address the present moment in American life of a profound 
transformation of American experience, which include: the closing of the 
frontier; the furious creation and consolidation of corporate capitalism (the 
Federal Reserve System was being debated just after the novel was published 
in 1879, and it was finally established in 1913); massive numbers of immigrants 
from southern and eastern Europe were coming to America; and, among 
the privileged classes, the Genteel Tradition was thriving. All but the last 
of these factors contributed to Bellamy’s notable success, his novel Looking 
Backwards, which was second only to Uncle Tom’s Cabin in numbers of sales 
in the nineteenth century. At the heart of MacIntyre’s argument is the ethical 
capacity – measured in action – to recognize or imagine the “end” or “ends” 
which particular situations call for.
In this passage, then, MacIntyre is articulating the manner in which narra-
tive – and particularly the provisional open-endedness of the “not-yet-completed 
narrative” that he describes, which is always a constitutive element of narrative 
itself – informs both ethics and writing. This is particularly important to my 
argument because it seems to me that the genre of Romance presents a closed 
system – an “already-completed narrative” – even while politics, ethics, and the 
historical materialism Jameson mentions are always open-ended. This is clear in 
the work of Martha Nussbaum, particularly in her engagements with Aristotle’s 
practical reasoning. In Love’s Knowledge she argues that “the content of rational 
choice must be supplied by nothing less messy than experience and stories of 
experience. Among the stories of conduct,” she continues,
the most true and informative will be works of literature, biography, and his-
tory; the more abstract the story gets, the less rational it is to use it as one’s only 
guide. Good deliberation is like theatrical or musical improvisation, where 
what counts is f lexibility, responsiveness, and openness to the external [...] 
(1990: 74)
Now Romance is abstract in ways that fiction – and particularly historical fiction – 
is not. It possesses the features that Frye suggested and that allows the Genteel 
Tradition precisely to “f lee” from history itself: its sense of “subjective intensity,” 
reverie, examining “characters in vacuo.” Moreover, the archetypes that Frye – 
and for that matter Jameson – discern in Romance are precisely the opposite 
of the intense perception that Nussbaum sees as the most important element 
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of engaged ethics. That is, it is no accident that Nussbaum entitles the chapter 
of Love’s Knowledge that I am quoting “The Discernment of Perception” and 
later describes “an Aristotelian perception-based morality” (1990: 165) because 
“practical insight,” as she says, “is an ability to recognize the salient features of 
a complex situation” (1990: 74). The aim of perception is “that of focusing on 
some concrete particular, either present or absent, in such a way as to see (or 
otherwise perceive) it as something, picking out its salient features, discerning 
its content” (1990: 77).  
In her analysis of Aristotle, she is following the lead of David Wiggins, who 
notes that in moral deliberation,
the relevant features of the situation may not all jump to the eye. To see what 
they are, to prompt the imagination to play upon the question and let it acti-
vate in ref lection and thought-experiment whatever concerns and passions it 
should activate, may require a higher order of situational appreciation or, as 
Aristotle would say, perception (aisthēsis). (1980: 233)
Perception, then, is the perception – and the “experience” – of the “the salient 
features” of a situation (Nussbaum 1990: 74) and, as Wiggins notes, “it is the 
mark of the man of practical wisdom . . .to be able to select from the infinite 
number of features of a situation those features that bear upon the notion or ideal 
of existence which it is his standing aim to make real” (1980: 236). Nussbaum 
also notes that “it is no surprise to find [Aristotle] invoking [“imagination”] 
in connection with the minor premise of the ‘practical syllogism,’ that is, the 
creature’s perception of an item in the world as something that answers to one 
of his or her practical interests or concerns” (1990: 77). Both, then, conceive of 
the activity of ethical deliberation to be the choice or discovery – the perception 
or discernment – of what is important (i.e., “salient”) in a particular situation. In 
fact, this constitutes the open-endedness of ethical deliberation. But archetypes 
work differently: they do not provoke deliberation but command assent to 
“forms” that are not historical but transcendental: the “stylized figures,” not 
the historical “personalities,” of narrative. In this, Romance, more than most 
genres, is organized around a system of rules.
Nussbaum argues, however that “experience” – end the ethical activities 
growing out of experience – “is concrete and not exhaustively summarizable in a 
system of rules” (1990: 75). In the same way, narrative fiction remains provisional 
and “not-yet-completed” in its final interpretations. But Romance, as a genre, is 
complete. Thus, by re-imagining Shays’ Rebellion as a Romance, Bellamy is, in 
effect, offering an ethical contradiction. The aim of historical fiction is to give 
the present a “living sense” of the past, a good approximation of how people, 
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living in a different time, might have experienced and understood their lives; to 
create the possibility for the present readers to deliberate over the political and 
ethical considerations that faced people long ago; and to allow people to draw 
analogies between their own time and the time that the historical fiction focuses 
upon. Romance does none of these things, which is perhaps why it appealed to 
the Genteel Tradition as a vehicle precisely to escape from these things. Bellamy, 
however, wanted to do these things: these are the aims – and to an important 
degree the achievement – of Looking Backwards, and I can reasonable assume 
that “looking backwards” to a moment of resistance and armed rebellion against 
injustice was precisely his purpose in The Duke of Stockbridge. Yet representing 
that time in a Romance undercuts this purpose, to the degree that it speaks to 
– and seemingly attempt to join – the Genteel Tradition.
As we all know, Looking Backwards is a utopian novel about looking forward: 
Bellamy imagines a socialist utopia a hundred years in the future, and his main 
character, Julian West, looks “backwards” at the world he has left. As I have 
argued, such “looking forward” is the work of ethics, its “deliberation” and its 
purpose. And I have suggested here that such “looking forward” is the work of 
literary narrative insofar as fiction offers future possibilities to be considered. 
This is also the work of historical fiction: to look backwards to the past in 
order to deliberate about the future for individuals (as they learn about moral 
possibilities for themselves through the vicarious experience of fiction) and 
for larger social groups. The work of Romance, however, is different. It aims, 
as Frye and Jameson suggest, at presenting archetypes which, by definition, 
are “complete.” This is the contradiction that haunts The Duke of Stockbridge: 
namely its attempt to provoke ethical deliberation in a narrative form that cuts it 
off. I hope, then, by offering a general discussion of literature, politics, and genre, 
I have shed light on the future orientation – the not-yet-completed narrative – of 
ethics itself, and in doing so to suggest the essential ethical nature of literary 
narrative.
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